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20 May 1987

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:

Director, Office of European Analysis

SUBJECT:

Talking Points for NSC Meeting on 21 May 1987

- l. The primary purpose of the 21 May NSC meeting is to discuss the political agenda of the President's trip to Europe, which includes a visit to Rome that has been downgraded from a State trip because of the election campaign currently taking place in Italy; an audience with the Pope; the Venice Summit; and a visit to Berlin in the company of Chancellor Kohl. The NSC staff plans the focus of the meeting to be the working out of the Venice political statement and particularly its East-West aspects. There are no plans to discuss the Berlin initiative but it may come up anyway. (Agenda at Attachment 1)
- 2. Our State colleagues report that Shultz plans to present the political setting for the trip, highlighting unsettled or contentious issues to be addressed with the other leaders, followed by a review of the key political issues and US positions on the table at the Venice Summit, including East-West relations, arms control, terrorism, South Africa, Iran-Iraq, and possibly the Middle East peace process, the Persian Gulf, and narcotics.
- 3. This will be followed by a review of the President's bilaterals, now definitely set with Thatcher, Nakasone, and Mulroney in Venice, and with Kohl on the plane to Bonn and Berlin. Separate bilaterals have been requested for Chirac and Mitterrand but reportedly are not yet scheduled. Finally, Schultz is expected to review issues for the Berlin portion of the trip. The latter may engender some controversy as the President, at the NSC's behest, has sent a letter to Mitterrand and Thatcher explaining that we are considering six proposals on Berlin and inviting their views. This letter has not been shared with any other Agency and Secretary Weinberger may use the NSC to reiterate his vigorous opposition to the proposed discussions with the Soviets about raising the air corridor flight ceiling above 10,000 feet.



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
Friday, May 22, 1987
11:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon
Cabinet Room

## POLITICAL AGENDA FOR PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO EUROPE

## Agenda

I.	Opening RemarksPres	ldent (3 minutes)
II.	Political OverviewSecr	•
	- Political Issues at the Venice Economic Summit	
	- Bilateral Meetings in Venice	
	- President's Trip to Rome, Vatican and the FRG	
III.	DiscussionAll	Participants (35 minutes)
IV.	SummaryFran	nk C. Carlucci

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20 May 1987

## ADCI TALKING POINTS TO THE NSC 22 MAY 1987

- 1. The challenges facing the West at the Venice summit pose serious threats to unity among the Western leaders:
  - -- The disagreements engendered by the economic decisions that the countries should make to help reduce large external imbalances and avoid protectionism are producing barely concealed resentment among the leaders and some public finger-pointing.
  - -- Among the non-US participants an unprecedented number are plagued by uncertainties about the staying power of their current governments.
  - -- Finally the Soviet Union now has a much more clever and tactically flexible Soviet leader who manages constantly to say yes in a way that confounds the West.
- 2. The economic issues facing the Summit participants have been discussed in this forum before, but domestic political constraints make it even less likely than in the past that agreements will be reached.

 The painful nature of the decisions to be made has produced open disputes between Japan and most of the other participants but also recriminations between various other countries.	
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The import of this resentment is that it complicates decisionmaking not only on economic but on other issues as well.


- 3. Almost all Western leaders also find themselves in need of success to buttress faltering or challenged domestic positions:
  - -- Italy will be represented by a caretaker Prime Minister anxious to place his party in the best light for the election that will follow the summit by less than two weeks.
  - -- France is plagued by a cohabitation scheme that forces two powerful politicians to weigh almost each decision first in terms of what it could do to their current institutional position and prospects in the presidential race next year.

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- -- West German Chancellor Kohl heads a coalition and a country deeply divided over East-West issues.
- -- The Canadian Prime Minister is the first in his country's history to have a lower rating in the polls than those of the two opposition leaders.
- -- The question facing the Japanese Prime Minister is not whether he leaves office but when and under what conditions.
- -- Paradoxically Prime Minister Thatcher is in the strongest position domestically even though she faces elections less than a week after the Summit. But these elections naturally make it imperative for her to avoid any domestically controversial steps that could be exploited by her challengers.
- 4. To make the situation even more difficult, Gorbachev has presented the West with the double dilemma of figuring out what he is really about and how to respond to his arms control initiatives.
  - -- His campaign to shake up and modernize the Soviet system appears so liberal compared to the policies of his predecessors that it is difficult to explain to publics that his real aim is not to change the Soviet system but to make it more efficient and thus more of a challenge to the West.
  - -- His abandonment of the dour noes we always got from Brezhnev and his heavies in favor of enthusiastic but still qualified yeses are harder for the West to handle. Nowhere is this more evident than in the LRINF/SRINF negotiations.
    - -- On LRINF he has created the impression that he has accepted the original Western 0-0 proposal, which foresaw the total elimination of a class of missiles, but in reality has only endorsed the compromise formula that was tentatively agreed to in Reykjavik as part of a larger package. What's more, he has done this after the governments of the basing countries had overcome considerable domestic opposition to INF deployments that, most of them feel, ensure their security better than any 0-0 option. Yet, for public relations reasons and because of their precarious domestic political standing, the West European leaders do not think they can oppose or at least take the lead in opposing the Gorbachev version of 0-0.
    - --The Western dilemma is even deeper over the accompanying Europe-only O-O SRINF proposal.
    - --The FRG, UK, and French governments feel that over the long term this proposal detracts from Western security by taking away another class of nuclear weapons that they need more than the



Soviet Union. Yet, in the politically all-important shorter term, they do not want to forego the publicly appealing aspects of a European O-O LRINF agreement by immediately embarking on a build-up of SRINF systems.

--The West German dilemma is even more profound. The government feels pressured either to accept a build-up of SRINF on its soil or acquiesce to a 0-0 SRINF solution that will see most of the remaining ballistic nuclear missiles in Europe both based in and targetted on German territory. Indeed Kohl's Christian Democrats, who have been the most stalwart proponents of a strong Western defense in Germany, are feeling increasingly embittered about being placed in a no-win situation by the double-zero option as currently framed.

5. In sum, the Venice summit finds the West facing a number of fundamental challenges. This makes the timing particularly opportune for Western leaders to display their determination to jointly provide the kind of leadership that will be equal to the momentous tasks facing them.

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